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Sunday, April 01, 2007

Love Thy Neighbor; Kill Thy Neighbor

Love Thy Neighbor; Kill Thy Neighbor - Part 1
Take a look at this piece! Don't you guys think Afghanistan has had to pay a very heavy price for its support to the Pukhtoonistan movement, the Pukhtoon nationalist leadership and not withdrawing from its historical claim over the Pukhtoon populated areas of Pakistan? Isn't it controrary to the notion presented by some of us that what Afghanistan has done for the unification is a mere lip-service as an eye wash?? And beside, what about the turns in the policies of our elders in the last 70/80 years? Do we deny the fact that in the colonial era our elders struggled for an autonomous Pukhtoon state in a united India? Do we as well deny the fact that soon after the partition our elders altered their separtist policy with an absolute integrationist approach and had to struggle hard to show their loyalties towards the federation of Pakistan? When was the last time our nationalist leaders spoke of a merger with Afghanistan?? Or shall I refer to the historical events to prove what I want to prove? Going through the first part of this article, I felt extremely ashamed of the fact that it has been us, the so called “Pakistani-Pukhtoons”, since day first who did the dirty work for the Punjabis against Afghanistan and its people. We can not simply pass the buck by holding a few individuals responsible for it! The irony is that it still happens to be us who do not let any opportunity slip away to demonize our Afghan brothers for the individual acts of some rulers at some point in history, to justify our “NO” to the idea of “LOY AFGHANISTAN”! What a Shame! What a paradox!Anyway, here is the article: Thy Neighbor; Kill Thy Neighbor Pakistan's Afghan policyBy: Dr. Hamid HussainPublished July 14, 2004IntroductionWe have earned the right to have (in Kabul) a power, which is very friendly toward us. We have taken risks as a front-line state, and we will not permit a return to the prewar situation, marked by a large Indian and Soviet influence and Afghan claims on our territory. Pakistani President General Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq (1) Pakistan and Afghanistan are neighbors with geographic, historic, linguistic and economic ties dating back to centuries before the emergence of modern nation states. Pakistan’s major security dilemma has been its poor relations with the large eastern neighbor India. On the issue of the disputed territory of Kashmir the two countries have fought a few wars and many skirmishes souring their relations. In this background, Pakistan has always been suspicious and frustrated by the unfriendly attitude of Afghan governments who had claimed influence over the Pushtun populations on the Pakistani side. Before the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the two countries had been involved in diplomatic and propaganda campaigns against each other resulting sometimes in breaking of diplomatic and economic relations. After the Soviet invasion in 1979, a major change in the relationship between them occurred. Close to three million Afghan refugees came to Pakistan and Pakistan assisted the Afghan resistance with money, weapons and diplomatic support in close association with the United States and Europe. This changed the dynamics of relations between two countries and Pakistan became more deeply and directly involved in the affairs of Afghanistan for almost three decades. The relations between these two countries have seen many shifts and changes depending on the prevailing regional and international events and pressures, in addition to internal factors operating in two countries. BackgroundSince the emergence of Pakistan as an independent state in 1947, relations with its western neighbor, Afghanistan has not been smooth. The Afghanistan government claimed its influence over the bordering areas of Pakistan where Pushtuns lived. In a meeting of tribal chieftains in Kabul on July 26, 1949, the old agreements between British and Afghanistan were repudiated. A month later, a tribal meeting inside Pakistani territory in the Afridi heartland of Tirah, with the support of the Afghan government, went a step further and announced the establishment of Pushtunistan. It also announced the establishment of a national assembly and adopted a new flag. (2) In retaliation, in December 1949, Pakistan blocked the movement of Afghan goods from Pakistani territory. In 1955 and 1961, the dispute between the two countries resulted in closure of borders for several months.(3) Afghanistan is a landlocked country which was totally dependent on a trade agreement with British India and later Pakistan for transport of all goods through the Pakistani port of Karachi. Poor relations with Pakistan and frequent closures of the borders between two countries and diplomatic skirmishes had unintended consequences. One major outcome was the gradual increasing influence of Soviet Union by opening of the northern route bordering Soviet Union. It was the threat to the vital petroleum supplies of Afghanistan coming through Pakistan which resulted in the signing of the barter and transit agreement with Soviet Union. The agreement provided duty free transit of Afghan goods through Soviet territory and building of large gasoline storage tanks in several locations.(4) Both sides also resorted to foment trouble in each other’s backyard by stirring the turbulent border tribes striding the ill defined long and porous border (Durand Line) between two countries. Crude and rough interactions at the highest levels did not allow any room for constructive engagement. When the Afghan Foreign Minister Muhammad Naim met Ayub Khan after the coup of 1958, Ayub was very rude. He gave Naim a lecture about the military power of Pakistan and boasted that if he wanted he could take Kabul within a few hours.(5) On the part of Afghan government, in 1976 when Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto planned a visit to Afghanistan, the Kabul government declined to give visas to two important members of Bhutto’s delegation who were from border provinces (Yahya Bakhtiar from Balochistan and Naseerullah Khan Babar from North West Frontier Province).(6) In 1973, King Zahir Shah’s cousin Muhammad Daud became the country’s head after the coup. Daud was a complex personality with strong ideas of his own with limited long-term vision. He was the most ardent supporter of the irredentist Pushtunistan issue, which had spoiled relations with Pakistan. In the early part of his rule, relations between the two countries deteriorated markedly. However by 1976, Daud started rapprochement with Pakistan and Iran. Pakistani Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto visited Kabul and Daud visited Pakistan and serious discussions to improve relations between the two countries were started. In this effort, the internal troubles facing both leaders were also instrumental. In Pakistan, Bhutto was facing a full scale rebellion by the Balochs whose areas were bordering Afghanistan while in Afghanistan the emerging tensions between Communist influenced political groups and Islamist opposition were threatening the long standing precarious balance in the country. Let the Games Begin The poor relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan moved to the next level when in early 1970s both countries started to host each other’s dissidents.(7) Afghanistan was hosting dissident Pushtun and Baluch leaders and Pakistan started to host some Islamist opposition leaders of Afghanistan. The Pakistani leadership was really apprehensive because it had recently witnessed the successful secession of the eastern wing of its country with active help of India. In December 1971, East Pakistan emerged as independent Bangladesh after a civil war and military intervention by India. Pakistan feared that a similar situation could happen on the western border with active involvement of Afghanistan and the Soviet Union. It was in this background that Pakistan overhauled its Afghan policy. In 1973, the then Inspector General of Frontier Corps (IGFC), Brigadier (later Major General) Naseerullah Khan Babar presented a paper on Afghanistan and Pakistani tribal areas. Frontier Corps is a border paramilitary force led by Pakistani army officers seconded to the militia which guard’s the country’s western borders. The main thrust of the paper was the fear of Soviet hegemony and potential of Afghan providing support to tribes residing in Pakistani territory. In the light of this assessment, an Afghan Cell was created. This was a high level secret group, which included four members - Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, Bhutto’s advisor on Foreign Affairs Aziz Ahmad, Chief of Army Staff General Tikka Khan and IGFC Babar. Dissidents from Afghanistan were brought to Pakistan where they were put on the payroll of FC and then sent to different locations and trained in handling of small arms and explosives. Babar’s two staff officers Colonel Ataur Rahman Kallu and Captain (later Major and a political leader) Aftab Ahmad Khan Sherpao helped Babar in coordination of some of these efforts. In this work, the then head of the Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) detachment in Peshawar, Major (later Brigadier Aslam Bodla) was also brought into the picture. Babar continued to supervise this operation after his retirement from the military when he was appointed governor of North West Frontier Province. Pakistan tried to recruit a small core group from each of the 29 provinces of Afghanistan. They would then go back and recruit more members inside Afghanistan. From 1973-77 about 2000-2500 Afghan dissidents were trained in Pakistan. Pakistanis provided them with Indian guns and explosives to avoid any negative fallout in case of exposure of the plan. (8)
After Bhutto’s visit to Kabul in June 1976 and Daud’s trip to Pakistan in August of the same year, Afghan dissidents were restrained by Pakistan. The initial group of dissidents which came to Pakistan included Burhanuddin Rabbani, Gulbaddin Hikmatyar, Ahmad Shah Masud and Sibghatullah Muajaddadi. In 1978, Najibullah (later a key member of the Afghan communist group and President) also came to Peshawar and met one of the Pakistani handlers of Afghan dissidents. He was introduced to Superintendent of Police Amanullah who was working as the Deputy Director of the civilian Intelligence Bureau (IB). However by that time General Zia-ul-Haq who had overthrown Bhutto’s government was in charge of the country and the Afghan dissidents had become orphans. Zia, busy with his own troubles didn’t continue the support of Afghan dissidents. First, a Pakistani mediator tried to hook them up with the Shah of Iran through the Iranian Consular General in Peshawar but there was no positive response as the Shah was already in big problem from his own Islamist challengers. The Afghans were then introduced to the Americans through diplomats based in Pakistan.(9) In 1978-79, as the internal power struggle inside Afghanistan intensified among Communist contenders, the contacts between the Pakistan government and these Afghan dissidents were revived, however they were low key. In 1973, the Pakistan army was fighting a full-scale insurgency in Balochistan. Some Balochs found refuge in Afghanistan where they were temporary settled in Helmand area. However, the Afghan government didn’t support them fully in their insurgency against the Pakistan government. In addition, some Pushtun dissidents like Ajmal Khattak of National Awami Party were given refuge in Kabul. There were many bombings in Pakistan’s bordering provinces, which Pakistan blamed on the Afghan government. In early 1980s, the son of former Prime Minister Bhutto, Murtaza Bhutto settled in Kabul with a small group of hard-core Pakistan Peoples Party workers to harass Zia’s government through sabotage. The Slippery Slope After the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979, a new set of realities emerged and the calculations for Pakistan changed enormously. Pakistan’s fears came true and Soviet soldiers were at its borders. For the first time, collaboration between India and Soviet Union to intensify pressures on eastern and western borders of Pakistan simultaneously became a reality. Internationally, General Zia ul Haq was isolated at that time and he attempted to get the support of the United States, Europe and the Islamic countries by convincing them that the next stop of Soviet troops was Pakistan. By early1980s, Pakistan was heavily involved in Afghan affairs on all fronts. In cooperation with Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and Saudi General Intelligence Directorate, Mukhabarat, Pakistani armed forces intelligence agency, Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) was now involved in a multi-billion dollar enterprise, which would change the dynamics of Pakistan’s internal and external affairs for a long time to come. (10) From 1980 to 1988, ISI kept firm control of Afghan policy trying not only to keep Americans at bay but also any other department of Pakistan. Pakistan’s President and army Chief General Zia ul Haq and Director General of ISI (DGISI) Lieutenant General (later General and Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee) Akhtar Abdur Rahman planned and coordinated Pakistan’s interaction with many resistance groups based in Pakistan and their operations inside Afghanistan exclusively through ISI. In this effort, they even kept senior military brass out of the loop and information was shared with other senior officers only on as needed basis and very sparingly. (11) Pakistani decision makers were firm believers of the theory that the Soviets wanted to reach the warm waters of the Indian Ocean and after pacifying Afghanistan they would come towards Pakistan. The main objective at that time was to tie up Soviets in Afghanistan and there was not much interest in a negotiated settlement of the issue. In this analysis, U.S. administration and CIA agreed with Pakistan. (12) In this phase of Pakistan’s Afghan policy, there were many internal and external factors which were at play. Pakistani decision makers were not independent in charting their course about Afghanistan. During the Soviet occupation, Pakistan was not sure that a united Afghan resistance (even if it was possible) would be in Pakistan’s interest. Zia-ul-Haq who was a witness to Palestinian Liberation Organization’s (PLO) emergence as a strong force in Lebanon and especially Jordan (he was the member of Pakistan’s military mission assigned to Jordan and participated in the September1970 clash between Palestinian guerrillas and Jordanian forces) had latent fears that a united Afghan resistance could become a PLO-like monster, which may threaten its creator. In addition, an independent Afghan leadership saddled in the trans-border sensitive area could create a common cause with independent minded Pushtuns of Pakistan that could destabilize the western frontiers. (13) In addition, at that time, no one really thought that the ragtag Afghan fighters would be able to push the Soviet troops out of Afghanistan. They were mainly seen as a force, which would not allow complete pacification of the country by Soviets, thus increasing the cost of occupation. The phrase that the United States and Pakistan were willing to fight to the last bullet and the last Afghan had its origin in this policy. To date there is no evidence that a well thought out strategic Afghan policy was formulated by the highest decision makers of Pakistan looking at both the military and the political aspect. Pakistan, by controlling the flow of money and arms had control over Peshawar based Pushtun dominated resistance groups. However, many educated elite, supporters of former King Zahir Shah and many other independent minded Afghan commanders tried their best to overcome Pakistan’s dominance over the whole project. They lobbied in Europe, Washington and complained to the visiting delegations of analysts and Congressmen about ISI corruption and advocated more direct American involvement. By 1985, they began to understand that ‘one way to lobby for weapons and power – and to outflank ISI’s controlling Brigadiers - was to build their own independent relationships in Washington and Riyadh’.(14) Internal feuding among different Afghan factions, active manipulation by Pakistani intelligence to put Afghans not in line with Pakistan’s policy in their proper place and emergence of different sources of patronage created the confusion which would continue throughout the resistance struggle. On part of the ISI, they were deeply suspicious of many Afghan resistance groups. They never trusted Massoud since his announcement of temporary truce with Soviets in 1983 and used this argument with their CIA counterparts to cut him off completely. A former head of Afghan Bureau of ISI Brigadier Syed Raza Ali later in an interview referring to Massoud stated that, ‘He set a policy of local cease-fire’ and therefore ‘so a man who’s working against the Afghan war, why should we deal with him?’ (15) In their decision about the supply of money and weapons, ISI argued that they were giving more weapons to those who were fighting more efficiently. This argument was used to justify decreasing supply to independent commanders. In this phase, the major success of Pakistan was to keep the Americans at bay in Pakistan and limit their independent interaction with Afghan resistance as much as possible. (16) For various reasons, CIA accepted this arrangement although they tried to have independent links with Afghans.(17) In this phase of the operations, CIA and US diplomats in Islamabad were of the view that it was in America’s interest to accept a Pakistani sphere of influence in Afghanistan. The most negative impact was Pakistan’s support of Afghan resistance to carry out urban bombings, assassinations and indiscriminate rocket attacks on Kabul city causing deaths of numerous innocent civilians. (18) Exotic explosives and timing devices provided by CIA helped in this while CIA was able to keep its hands clean.(19) Many ordinary Afghans blamed Pakistan for this round of indiscriminate violence.
Bitter Harvest After the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989, the deadly phase of internal struggle among various Afghan groups started. Pakistan was a major player in this phase of the war also. However, significant involvement of U.S., British and Saudi intelligence in Pakistan and Afghanistan complicated the picture. On the other hand, the newly independent Central Asian Republics bordering Afghanistan (Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan), Russia, Iran and India got involved in Afghanistan further confusing the picture. By 1990, the failure of resistance groups to topple Najibullah resulted in a review of the policy. Although the main thrust was towards a military solution but the civilian government of Benazir Bhutto had also favored a political process to bring different factions together. Benazir, suspicious about the political role of the ISI, brought a retired officer Lt. General Shams Ur Rahman Kallu to head the agency. However, Kallu was successfully blocked out by his own agency and army Chief General Mirza Aslam Beg. These internal intrigues and struggle for control of Afghan policy affected the overall operation. In addition, the State Department under an interagency Afghan group (it was led by Peter Tomsen and other members included Chief of Near East division of CIA Thomas Twetten, Richard Haas from National Security Council and delegates from Pentagon and sections of State Department) decided to strengthen the Afghan commanders inside Afghanistan. This effort by the State Department opened a new channel of money and guns to commanders. (20) Two meetings of National Commanders Shura in Paktia and Kunar alarmed the ISI who saw this as an effort to outflank them. They tried to break away some of these commanders and invited Massoud to Islamabad for a meeting. Later, ISI opened channels of negotiations with Najib and former King Zahir Shah. (21) In 1992, when Russia cut Najibullah off, a race for Kabul started. In Peshawar, ISI Chief Lieutenant General Asad Durrani and Saudi intelligence Chief Prince Turki al-Faisal with the help of some Saudi religious scholars unsuccessfully tried to bring feuding Afghans to agree to a transitional government. Hikmatyar, sitting with his fighters in Kabul’s suburb of Chaharasyab had cut a deal with Interior Ministry communists and expected to ride into Kabul as a victor. Massoud outsmarted all his opponents when his allies in Kabul got control of the airport and within hours Dostum’s Uzbek militiamen were pouring out of the transport planes to take control of the city. A frustrated and angry Hikmatyar lobbed rockets at Kabul while his fighters were chased out of Kabul.(22) From 1992 to 1996, Afghanistan was in total chaos where regional warlords and bandits were on the ascendancy making the life of citizens a living hell. Murders, lootings, extortion and rapes were rampant all over the country where warlords held sway over their swaths of territories. Then a storm started from the south of the country and very quickly overtook the country. The phenomenon of the emergence of Taliban baffled the world and surprised many observers. So little was known about this new Pushtun militia that was dominated by scholars and students of religious schools (madrassas), that a flurry of theories emerged to explain the movement. Some saw it as the response of a frustrated sincere group of Afghans who wanted to get rid of the anarchy while others saw them as another tool of the Pakistani intelligence subsidized by Saudi and U.S. intelligence. The movement was an indigenous phenomenon, which was quickly embraced by Pakistan and Saudi Arabia to secure their own interests. The visible involvement of ISI and other segments of Pakistani government with the Taliban convinced everybody that they were the creation of Pakistani intelligence to serve its interest in the country. (23) The relationship between Pakistan and Taliban was the result of evolution of a complex set of events which occurred in both countries at that particular time. In 1993, after the sacking of the Nawaz Sharif government, army chief Abdul Waheed Kakar sacked DG ISI Lt. General Javed Nasir and appointed Lt. General Javed Ashraf Qazi to ‘cleanse’ the spy agency. A large number of officers, including those in the Afghan Bureau were retired or posted back to their units. However, many of them found their way back on the Afghan scene as military attaches and consulars in different cities of Afghanistan. The raging civil war centered on Kabul had frustrated Pakistani hopes of peace in the country. The civilian government of Benazir was thinking about a land link with the newly independent Central Asian Republics and the route through southern Afghanistan was the shortest, although infested with rapacious warlords. Pakistani policy makers thought that this new Pushtun militia based in the south might help unite Pushtuns and clear southern approach. Initially, Pakistan supplied fuel and gave some trade concessions to the Taliban. However, gradually the relationship grew rapidly as Taliban started to expand to other cities. The fall of Herat to Taliban indicated that the new militia might be able to take over the country. At that stage, Pakistan being under the sanctions imposed by the U.S. didn’t have any extra money to fund this adventure at its western borders. Pakistan introduced Taliban as a new stabilizing force to Saudis. In early 1995, Ahmad Badeeb, Chief of Staff to Saudi intelligence Chief Prince Turki al-Faisal visited Kandahar and later Turki met with Taliban representative Mullah Muhammad Rabbani in Islamabad. Mukhabarat and ISI relationships increased as now Saudi money was coming for the Afghan policy of Pakistan. (24) The Saudi connection with Taliban continued until they broke on the issue of Osama Bin Laden. Nawaz Sharif and later General Musharraf, coming under increasing international pressure unsuccessfully tried to influence the Taliban to moderate their policies on certain issues. The result was increasing frustration of Pakistanis but at the same time they had to keep engaged with them, as they had no other option. It was only after the September 11 catastrophe that Pakistan had to finally break the link with Taliban. Afghans are well known for their deal making but at the same time they are fiercely independent and many foreigners who had dealt with them had come to grief when they thought they could simply dictate to Afghans. Abdur Rab Rasul Sayyaf and Gulbaddin Hikmatyar had received large amounts of money and weapons form Saudi Arabia and direct patronage by Saudis helped their stature among resistance groups. However, during the First Gulf war in 1991, both of them denounced Saudi Arabia and supported Saddam Hussain. Hikmatyar had the audacity to go back to Saudi Arabia asking for help when the Taliban exiled him. Similarly, Pakistan was disappointed by many of its Afghan protégés frequently. Many of them refused to take Pakistani dictation and even ridiculed ISI officers who were assigned to them when the later tried to give them military advice. The Taliban refused to accept the Durand Line between two countries as the international boundary. On October 07, 1999, DG ISI Lieutenant General Khawaja Ziauddin Butt flew to Kandahar and confronted Mullah Omar with evidence of presence of training camps of extremist Sunni outfits that were involved in killing of Shias in Pakistan. He gave Ziauddin the cold shoulder telling him to go back to Pakistan to find the terrorist training camps there, as Afghanistan had none. (25) Similarly, in 2000-2001 Major General Faiz Jeelani of ISI would go to Kandahar to deal with the tricky issues. When Interior Minister retired Lieutenant General Moinuddin Haider was holding meeting with Mullah Omar complaining about Pakistani extremists hiding in Afghanistan, one of Omar’s aid took a Pakistani official aside and asked: ‘Does he really know what he is talking about, he is clueless about what is going on’.(26) Different Afghan factions made and broke alliances with such a dizzying speed that no one could make any sense of it. All Afghan factions who were killing each other with impunity also kept back channels open with their mortal enemies and willing to make a deal any moment. ‘The persistence of such back channels between opposing factions bedeviled their foreign sponsors throughout the post-Najibullah period, stymieing every attempt to orchestrate events on the ground according to the rules of hard-and-fast alliance’. (27) This factor not only puzzled their many Pakistani handlers but caused much resentment and anger when a particular individual or group, while taking everything from cash and weapons snubbed Pakistanis whenever the chance rose. In this, Afghans took advantage by aligning with different power centers in Pakistan.
Conclusion:After September 11, 2001, the international geo-strategic situation changed so quickly with focus on Afghanistan that Pakistan had to make a hasty retreat due to the compelling situation. After the completion of U.S. military operations in Afghanistan, Pakistan had time to think about the future course. It seems that the military brass is of the view that sooner or later the Americans will leave Afghanistan. They fear that then Afghanistan will divide on ethnic lines. In that case they want to have some control over Pushtuns of Afghanistan to prevent destabilization of their western border. Even if Afghanistan does not fragment, Pakistan’s genuine concern for a friendly Pushtun dominated regime in Kabul is a constant, which has not changed regardless of the religious factor and international changes. Like all other decisions of the country, Pakistan’s foreign policy is also a highly personalized affair. ‘The result of such highly personalized nature of the operation is the fact that when the person involved is gone, there is no continuity of the policy’ with ‘no organized coherent effort on the policy issues taking into account military, diplomatic, social and economic aspects of the conflict’. (28) Competition among various individuals and groups and more stress on intrigue rather than a well thought out plan prevented the emergence of a coherent policy towards Afghanistan. The central theme of Pakistan’s Afghan policy is the national security concern of securing the western border by having a sympathetic Pushtun government. This has not changed over decades. The policy, which Pakistan adopted in different times, resulted in events, which Pakistan could not comprehend fully, let alone control effectively. The result was that repeatedly, Pakistani decision makers found themselves in tough situations where they fully appreciated the dangers of the given policy but thought that there was no other alternative but to push through the given policy. In this, they never planned for control of unintended consequences of their Afghan policy, which were not limited to two countries but had wider regional and international repercussions. In the past, Pakistan attempted to address its genuine national security concerns through a policy of supporting its proxies with the hope that they will safeguard its interests. This was a wrong assumption, as never in the history of Afghanistan has any foreign power been able to achieve it. Recently, there was some deterioration of relations between two countries with firing between border guards and verbal assaults by diplomats of both countries. Afghan officials frustrated at the violence in border provinces protested publicly to Pakistan when Pakistan didn’t respond to their earlier concerns. (29) The United States, Afghanistan and Iran have to understand and accommodate some genuine security concerns of Pakistan. This is must for regional stability. A continuous dialogue between Pakistan and Afghanistan at different levels is must so that mutual concerns are discussed and ways found to overcome difficulties. Both countries have to accommodate each other. In the last two years, India, using its good relations with the Northern Alliance commanders has opened consulates in Mazar Sharif, Qandahar, Herat and Jalalabad. This has alarmed Pakistan and it views these developments as a newly emerging threat on the western borders. (30) The Afghan government and U.S. administration has to understand Pakistan’s genuine concerns about rapidly increasing influence of India in Afghanistan. While it is up to the Afghans to decide what is best for them, however they have to understand Pakistan’s genuine concerns and address them to improve relations and prevent misunderstandings and problems. Afghanistan itself is a long way from stability and it will need the help of Pakistan, which will be crucial. On the part of Pakistan, the policy makers, especially the military leadership has to come to grip with a changed international environment. While it has to safeguard its security interest on western borders and prevent upheaval among its border tribes, it has to be realistic in its objectives and need not to overstretch beyond its capabilities and position itself for hegemony over Afghanistan. Notes: 1- quoted in Steve Coll. Ghost Wars: The secret history of CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Ladin, from the Soviet invasion to September 10, 2001 (New York: Penguin Press, 2004), p. 1752- Abdul Samad Ghaus. The Fall of Afghanistan: An Insider’s Account (London: Pergamon-Brassey’s International Defense Publishers, 1988), p. 713- for details of this mutual acrimony see Ghaus. The Fall of Afghanistan, p. 69-724- for details of this aspect see Henry S. Bradsher. Afghanistan and the Soviet Union (Durham: Duke University Press, 1985 New & expanded edition), p. 20-24 & 27-28 and Ghaus. The Fall of Afghanistan, p. 74-75 & 90-925- Ghaus. The Fall of Afghanistan, p. 906- Author’s interview with a Pakistani source close to this event, July 20047- for details of this see Anthony Hyman. Afghanistan Under Soviet Domination 1964-81 (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1982), p. 68-698- Author’s interview with a Pakistani source close to these events and with first hand knowledge of details of the operation, July 20049- Author’s interview with a Pakistani source close to these contacts, July 200410- for details of these operations see Hamid Hussain. United States-Pakistan Relations - Myths and Realities. Defence Journal, November 2003), p. 15-2111- Author’s interview with a senior army officer who served as Corps Commander at that time, 200212- for details of the complex relationship between CIA and ISI see Hamid Hussain. Forgotten Ties: CIA, ISI & Taliban. CovertAction Quarterly, No: 71, Spring 2002, p. 3-513- David B. Edwards. Before Taliban: Genealogies of the Afghan Jihad (Los Angeles, California: University of California Press, 2002), p. 26214- Coll. Ghost Wars, p. 101 & 130-3115- quoted in Coll. Ghost Wars, p. 11916- Mohammad Yousaf & Mark Adkin. The Bear Trap: Afghanistan’s Untold Story (Lahore: Jang Publishers, 1993, Fifth Edition), p. 8117- for details of this aspect, see Hamid Hussain. United States-Pakistan Relations - Myths & Realities, p. 16-1718- for details of these see Yousaf & Adkin. The Bear Trap, p. 146-4719- for details see George Crile. Charlie Wilson’s War (New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 2003), p. 335 & 34920- Coll. Ghost Wars, p. 207-8 & 22521- Author’s interviews with two Pakistani sources close to these negotiations, October 2002, July 200422- Coll. Ghost Wars, p. 235-3723- for details of Pakistan and Taliban connection see Imtiaz Gul. The Unholy Nexus: Pak-Afghan Relations Under The Taliban (Lahore: Vanguard Books, 2002) and Ahmed Rashid. Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia (New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 200024- Coll. Ghost Wars, p. 294-9625- Author’s interview with a source familiar with the incident, October 200226- Gul. The Unholy Nexus, p. 4927- Michael Griffin. Reaping The Whirl Wind: The Taliban Movement in Afghanistan (London: Pluto Press, 2001), p. 10628- Hamid Hussain. Time For Reflection: Pakistan’s Afghanistan Policy. Defence Journal, December 2001, p. 4929- Author’s interview with a Pakistani source close to events in Afghanistan, January 200430- for details of this concern on part of Pakistan see Hamid Hussain. Shifting Sands of Afghanistan. Defence Journal, November 2003

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